The 150th anniversary of the Emancipation Proclamation has attracted scholarly and popular attention alike, but all this interest seems to have generated more heat than light . Lincoln's intentions and motivations, in particular, remain at least partly inscrutable. Was he acting as a reformer, or a lawyer? Were his motivations primarily moral, or practical and strategic? What notion of freedom, precisely, did he envision for freed African-Americans? This essay does not seek to provide conclusive answersto these questions, but it does suggest a fruitful place to begin an exploration of them . The work of the late Elizabeth B. Clark analyzes antebellum reformers, abolitionists in particular, and offers an important perspective on how and why emancipation was ultimately achieved.
truths, but in an individual's obligations to develop fully her divinelybestowed gifts. Individual rights in general were "individual" not in reference to any Enlightenment-era sense of the liberal, autonomous person, but by "identification with the right of private judgment" and individual conscience. These reformers perceived themselves as heirs of the Reformation, not the Revolution, in their opposition to state policies regarding slavery. In fact, Clark reports, abolitionists had little regard for the reformative capacity of law itself, and for evangelical reformers, "the rejection of legalism served as a leitmotif in the struggle against Calvinism and slavery both." The institution of slavery (and as later reformers would point out, marriage), after all, was a corrupt legal arrangement according to which the state had privatized certain domestic relationships and their concomitant mechanisms of social ordering. Some anti-slavery activists even discouraged their adherents from participating in the legal sys- tem in any way, and Clark describes some antebellum feminists as utterly "divorced from law and legal processes,'?
The rejection of legalism also entailed a rejection of legalistic discourse. The language of religious reformers, as Clark reminds us, was deliberately emotional, as preachers exhorted their listeners to identify imaginatively with the plight of enslaved people, and anti-slavery literature relied on graphic, vivid imagery of physical abuse to stir feelings of horror and sympathy in its readers. Evangelical religious and antislavery rhetoric was anecdotal rather than argumentative, conversational rather than didactic, and often in the more immediate first-person voice rather than the detached third-person-in every way, opposed to the "cold, dry legalism of orthodoxy."
The reformers' preference for an affective style of discourse, as well as their preoccupation with social relationships of sympathy, developed in a broader culture increasingly attuned to matters of "personal spirituality" and "moral relations with others," Contemporary romantic and sentimental literature, Clark argues, focused not on the "classic restraint problems of sovereignty, but rather the problems of perception and connection, for which law is useless but intuition is kev," Here Clark is most directly writing about the changing nature of authority in early nineteenth-century American culture, but she also seems to be making a point about how reformers perceived the broader problems of social ordering. For abolitionists and other religious reformers, slaveholding and orthodox Protestantism alike were corrupt institutions sustained by soulless legal formulas, which could be rehabilitated (or eliminated, in the case of slavery), only by hearkening to the cries of individual conscience, which supplied not only a supra-legal moral judgment but also the impetus to act upon that judgment." Surely Clark is correct in emphasizing the unique epistemelogical loyalties of religious reformers, and in drawing a sharp contrast between law and intuition as alternate means of constructing a worldview in nineteenth-century America . And drawing this contrast is an important component of the larger argument which weaves its way through all her articles on antebellum reform : the women's and abolitionist movements were not essentially secular, as many historians have described them, but rather were rooted in liberal Protestantism. Clark's analysis consistently distinguishes religiousminded reformers from the hidebound institutions of church and state, emphasizing the reformers' evangelical and sentimental ideology, vividly emotional and persuasive discourse, distrust of excessive state power, and antipathy towards clerical authority and hierarchies. The secular state and ecclesiastical institutions, meanwhile, were typified by a legalistic adherence to precedence and procedure, a secular and rational discourse, an emphasis on argument over analogy or sympathy, an individualistic conception of rights, and an inherently masculine character."
The distinctions between liberal Protestantism and law, distinctions that were profoundly gendered, were paralleled in differences between the private and public rhetoric of antebellum religious reformers. The 1848 Seneca Falls Convention's Declaration of Sentiments, for example, is famous for its evocation of the language of the Declaration of Independence . We now know from Clark's work that the Declaration of Sentiments was less a direct reflection of the philosophy of most women reformers than a conscious adaptation designedto appealto constitutionally-minded men. Forthese women, rights came from God, not from government, and existed not as a guarantor of individual liberty but as a means to achieve divinelyintended self-expression, an infinitely more radical and potentially socially transformative vision of rights and government: "Rights claims for antebellum feminists were not in the nature of strict bids for inclusion in a grant of powers and protections from human government. Rather, they expressed the terms on which individuals could best live out God's designs for human happiness." Yet, save perhaps for a few passages, this is not how the Declaration of Sentiments reads."
Clark perceivesthe stark contrasts between reformers' public and private communications, both in content and in style, astantamount to "two distinct languages," indicating that "women themselves S " M asculinit y" in this context was typified by the drinking and swearing practiced by members of the legal profession. Clark, 3 Wis. Women's l.J ., at 38-41.
identified their values and politics as in some way separate from men's. " And indeed, the "gender-based legal critique" of some reform periodicals so fiercely attacked the legitimacy of manmade law that it applauded extra-legal violence in furtherance of reform goals, such as the woman who horsewhipped a bartender in the name of temperance.' Such drastic measures were necessary in the eyes of reformers, Clark explains, because the law and legal institutions were so utterly unresponsive to the moral claims of women. The anti-legal stance of many female reformers, notwithstanding their goal of gender equality, was firmly rooted in a contemporary ideology of gender difference. Women reformers themselves understood there to be fundamental differences between the sexes, differences which in no way translated into women's inferior status, but were central to reformers' conceptions of social evils and their necessary correctives." Thus, law was a tool of men, while women, utterly "divorced from law and legal processes," sought to "promote moral sentiments."9
The broad dichotomy Clark establishes between liberal Protestantism and law in early nineteenth-century America serves not only to clarify her point about the religious background, philosophy, and goals of the reformers, a novel and important argument in itself, but Iso to bolster her critique of Elizabeth CadyStanton for her post-Civil War shift toward the side of legal orthodoxy in her worldview and political strategy. Stanton's later focus on individual autonomy, Clark argues, led her to reject greater state involvement in domestic relations, thereby limiting the achievements of liberal fernlnisrn .'? In Clark's recounting, then, Stanton's career was a model in disillu- 7 Clark, 3 Wis. Women 's L.J . at 44,40-41. 8 Here Clark parts company from Ellen DuBois and other historians who would exclude difference-minded reformers from the genealogy of true, equality -minded feminism. Most of these early women reformers did not believe they had to be identical to men in order to merit equal civic and political status; in fact, the ir ostensibly superior moral characters actually endowed with them superior qualifications for participation in pol itics and governance. See, e.q., See Ellen Carol DuBois, Outgrowing the Compact of the Fathers: Equal Rights, Woman Suffrage, and the United States Constitution, 74 J. Am. Hist. 836, 843, 856-57 (1987) . sioned and misguided retrenchment, a regrettable abandonment of the reformers' moralistic and sympathetic culture for the perceived practicality of liberal individualism.
In order to characterize Stanton as having gone to the dark side, however, and in order to maintain her focus on the essentially religious orientation of early nineteenth-century women reformers, Clark needs to maintain a clear picture of distinct "sides," to contrast clearly the world of the spiritual and sympathetic from the world of the rational and legalistic. Yet these two spheres may not have been as impermeable as she at times seems to suggest. Despite their disdain for legalism as a worldview, and their distrust of the law as a mechanism for effecting social change, religious women reformers nonetheless did attempt to achieve legal reforms, and they were certainly capable of adopting legalistic language when it suited their purposes to do so; the 1848 Declaration of Sentiments is only one example of this sort of translation. Thesewomen, whose private communications were suffused with religious imagery and animated by broad, morality-based arguments, corseted their otherwise radical public pronouncements and appeals to male lawmakers into the reassuringly familiar mode of liberal ideology, with its strict focus on the political and legal rights of the individual.
Moreover, the two spheres of evangelical reformers and legal actors were hardly mutually exclusive in terms of their discourse. Even the most heartwrenching depictions of the abuse of slaves were presented according to "scrupulous standards of proof," relying on "firsthand testimony" not only to stir readers' emotions but also to "[avoid] hearsay." One gets the impression that for all their evangelical fervor, antislavery advocates were also highly conscious of meeting legal standards of proof; Clark quotes Theodore Weld and the Grimkes asserting that "'Facts and testimonies are troops, weapons and victory, all in one.'''ll And one advocate for the moral supremacy of private judgment over manmade laws and institutions argued, "This necessity of answering for himself at the bar of God, obliges every man to act an independent part."'12 It is telling that in describing an individual's relationship with God, "unmediated by civil or ecclesiastical authorities," the abolitionist quoted here nonetheless resorted to a legalistic metaphor, cloaking the divine in judicial robes and casting the good Christian as a courtroom defendant (or, perhaps, an attorney)." These examples are not culled from appeals to male lawmakers, but from texts largely intended for the reform community itself; it seems unlikely that these legal standards and metaphors were consciously deployed as a rhetorical strategy. Rather, these authors reflexively chose language which resonated with them and their readers. Throughout these essays, Clark rightly insists that we take these women reformers at their word, and listen carefully to how they described their objectives and themselves. But if the "language women spoke among themselves" both manifested and manufactured the unique culture of early nineteenth-century female reform movements, then we need to grapple with the fact that so much of this language was in fact legalistlc." Notwithstanding their philosophical and moral objections to legalism and the legal system, religious reformers still inhabited a world in which legal standards were the sine qua non of proof, and legal metaphors had the most evocative associations with fairness and justice. Just as women reformers, however radical, were nonetheless acting within a cultural context in which significant differences between the sexes were largely unquestioned as both natural and desirable, they were also acting within a cultural context that embraced law and legal forms as some of the most legitimate expressions of community values, and legal standards (e.g., of proof, of evidence) as important guarantors of rights and liberties. And just as they could not fail to be inf luenced by prevailing gender norms, nor could they ever wholly escapecontemporary valuations of the law, as a symbol or metaphor as much as an institution.
But in order to understand fully the significance of writing in legalistic metaphors, we would have to know more about the legal culture of early nineteenth-century America. For while the religious ideology of antebellum reformers certainly conditioned the ways in which they thought about law, its usefulness as a tool of reform, and their relationship to it , their views were just as certainly informed by contemporary legal culture, the "values and attitudes which bind the [legal] system together, and which determine the place of the legal system in the culture of the society as a whole."ls Many women reformers perceived American legal and political culture as thoroughly masculine, in the worst sense of the word, populated by rum-swilling, brawling, and profanely swearing judges and legislators." But while the outspoken critique of masculine legal culture may have been new, the very identification of the law with masculine values and activities was not. In eighteenth-century Connecticut, for example, ascolonial civil courts adopted more technical legal procedures and focused their business on extra-local economic relationships, women became lessand less likely to appear in court. And in criminal courts, men tended to speak in legalistic language, while women spoke in more religious terms." Women's " [divorce] from law and legal processes," like most painful breakups, had a long history of alienation and miscommunication, after all, and it would be easier to understand the final dissolution, not to mention the later reconciliation, if we had some sense of this history. Complicating the dichotomy Clark sets up between religious reformers and secular legalists in this way returns us to our original question. Given abolitionists' antipathy for legalism on both philosophical and stylistic grounds, how did these keepers of the flame of liberal political theory convert their notions of individual rights into legal reality? Clark occasionally hints at the mechanism by which affective, emotional rhetoric penetrated the dry discourse of legal institutions, as when she suggests that "The spare liberal notion of bodily autonomy made its way into the courts cloaked in sentimental garb," or that " narrat ives of suffering .. . shape[d] arguments for legal redress."IB She argues that expanded notions of "the rights of the person" propounded by abolitionist activists altered social and legal norms, resulting in " broadened definitions of assault" in the criminal law and contributing to the "slow process of the constitutionalization of individual rights." The "rhetoric of sympathy," too, introduced "empathic identification" to American culture, most significantly in making arguments by analogy effective 15 Lawrence Friedman, Legal Culture and Social Development, 4 L. Socy. Rev. 29, 34 (1969) . 16 Clark, 3 Wis . Women's LJ. at 40 . 17 Cornelia Hughes Dayton, Women before the Bar: Gender, Law, and Society in Connecticut, 1639 -1789 , passim (U.N.C. Press, 1995 ; Dayton, Taking the Trade: Abortion and Gender Relations in an Eighteenth-Century New England Village , 48
Wm . & Mary Q 19, passim (1991) . 18 Clark, 82 J. Am . Hist. at 486 , 486 n. 58 . in constitutional jurisprudence for the first time." And as the reformers' vigorous anticlericalism expanded to undermine all forms of discretionary authority and hierarchical status relationships it contributed to liberalism's "theory of limited state power."> But this is the extent of what we are told about how the extralegal-if not downright anti-legal-ideologies of antebellum religious reformers eventually became legal ideologies, and even legal realities, themselves. This is not to suggest that Clark should have undertaken a detailed analysis of how reformists' philosophical principles migrated into legal standards, procedures, and institutions; this is not her central project." And it is not to question the premise that sentimental language can effect cultural shifts resulting in legal change; we have to look no further than the recent success of the religious right in shaping public opinion in this country on a whole range of social issues, notably abortion and gay marriage, to see the power of emotional rhetoric. However, it would be helpful to hear more about the political strategy that directed avowed anti-legalists to seek change through the law, and the cultural shifts that primed ostensibly orthodox judges and legislators to accept sympathetic and sentimental arguments for legal change.
Clark does tell us that beginning in the 1850s, women reformers began to accept legal and political means of reform, and increasingly sought change through legislative and judicial action rather than through moral suasion. The immediate efficacy of anti-liquor legislation trumped many women's philosophical preference for achieving individual and social reform through persuasion and conversion, and endowed the formerly secondary goal of suffrage with new significance. This new "emphasis on legal rights, narrowly conceived," Clark argues, "diminished discussions of economic and social entitlement." But even these new claims for legal rights were premised upon older, gendered ideas about women's obligations to their families and communities, not necessarily their civil rights as autonomous individuals ." 19 Clark, 82 J. Am . Hist. at 492. 20 Clark, Anticlericalism at 36. 21 For an example of such an approach, see Barbara S. Shapiro," Beyond Reasonable Doubt" and "Probable Cause": Historical Perspectives on the Anglo-American Law of Evidence, passim (U. Cal. Press, 1991) and Shapiro, Probability and Certainty in Seventeenth-Century England: A Study of the Relationsh ip between Natural Science, Religion, History, Law, and Literature, passim (Princeton U. Press, 1983 ) . 22 Clark, 3 Wis. Women's L.J. at 56. Vol. 53 Given what Clark has told us about reformers' earlier opposition to legal institutions and orthodoxies, it is unsurprising that they did not plunge with abandon into a more secular, rights-oriented discourse. The philosophical and discursive shifts Clark describes are more uncertain, subtle, and complex-which makes one wish she would have had the time to explore them more fully. Important questions remain : did the early nineteenth-century reform movements and their fervent religious discourse mark an isolated moment, a deviation from secular liberal individualism between the first two great eras of constitutional change, the founding era itself and the post-Civil War Amendments? That is, did liberal religious thought interrupt a tradition of secular rational conceptualization of individual rights, or was it actually an important element of that tradition? How does our answer to this question shape our understanding of the intent and meaning of the Emancipation Proclamation? And if sympathy and sentimentality eventually penetrated jurisprudential reasoning and discourse, did they survive in evangelical or in humanistic form-just what is this "persistent strand in our rights tradition"?"
AMERICANJOURNAL OF LEGAL HISTORY
We might wish for more from Clark herself, but with her many important insights, her quietly understated revelations, and the dense network of ideas within her own discourse, she has left future historians-of women, of politics, and of the law, for startersample foundation for further thought and research. Her elaboration of the religious strains in antebellum political theory provides a richer context for scholars who seek the full measure of Lincolnno stranger to the rhetoric of religious reformers himself-and his Emancipation Proclamation. The mid-century changes in legal discourse that she so matter-of-factly observes are in themselves provocative phenomena for scholars of legal language and culture, and the conversion of lawmakers and judges from orthodox legal analysis to sympathetic reasoning should be further explored by legal historians. Elizabeth Clark was able to leave us, however, a new and deeper appreciation for the crucial role played by antebellum women reformers in shaping and preserving the cultural, political, and constitutional history of individual rights in America. possibly not known at all, at least to those outside the fields of religious or modern European history. We are not surprised to find such a list in the work of those associated with a religious tradition-the author is in fact Ronald Wells, of the history department at Calvin College. And we would not be surprised to find such a list in a work by Betsy Clark.
This comment discusses two ways in which Betsy Clark's work is out of the ordinary. The first relates to the way in which she read texts, and the kinds of things she read. The second relates to the particular concerns she brought to the essays in the unfinished book she called, Women, Church, and State.
I.
As to her reading, one can comment both on the manner of the reading and the subjects of it.
Betsy Clark fit things together in ways that, while not unique to her, made her highly unusual in her professional context. Her extraordinary intellectual strength was the ability to project herself into the minds of those who lived in another time and who thought in other categories. To a notable degree, she was able to go beyond conventional approaches, particularly approaches relating to religion, and reach the historical connections which are understood now to be a major contribution of her scholarship.
Betsy Clark stands outside of law and looks at it. But where is she standing when she does that? She was a historian who taught on a law faculty. Religion, religious thinking, literature, law, and culture were not things apart, separated by disciplinary boundaries, but were integrated in her general historical discussions. Is she, then, standing on the platform of history? Law? Something else?
If we were to say that it is from history she looked at law, we might have expected her to look through the optics on law provided by major contemporary historians. But Betsy Clark was not doing that. She read Stanton, or Willard, for example, and wanted to know how they saw law and rights. If they read Stephen Pearl Andrews or Charles Fourier, then she would also. Writing about religion, she only briefly engaged the familiar historical arguments over the history of church and state. Rather, she tried to reconstruct the role of religion, and the relation of religion and law as it seemed to exist in the heads of the specific people she wrote about. One concludes that 3 she was trying to stand not where her discipline placed her, looking at law, but where her individual human subject placed her. As Steven Wilf suggested to me, we may want to describe her method in terms of the goals of a figure like Wilhem Diltheyemphasizing the need for understanding of the cultural, immersion in the details of social environment, stressing the need for understanding (as distinct from mere knowing), and of empathy.
At times, Betsy Clark saw herself as writing history, unmodified. When she comments that her approach to evangelical and liberal Protestantism may seem like "egregious lumping", 2 she writes as a part of a profession which might consider inappropriate joining egregious. It is as one writing history that she rejected "monocausal history." 3 At other times, there is a quality of normativity in her writing which places her closer to law. Sometimes the normative shows up in a footnote, as when she writes that " [w] hatever Foucault thinks about voluntary pain," her position, "is that, until invited, not beating people is better than beating people." 4 But this kind of personal footnote is not the only thing that seems beyond the familiar historical discourse. Rather, it is the apparent need to pass on the substantive question. When she discusses the feminist orientation of various historians, Betsy Clark does not seem to be engaged in a discussion of historiography. Rather, she seems to be seriously concerned about something else: which version is the truest to feminism. As Aviam 2 Elizabeth B. Clark, The Sacred Rights of the Weak: Pain, Sympathy, and the Culture of Individual Rights in Antebellum America, 82 J. OF AM. HIST. 463, 464 (1995 Soifer points out, in general, she "was committed on an ongoing basis to the unrealizable search for justice." And he adds, "[t]his commitment drew her passionately, yet critically, to other seekers … to protesters who sought the reformation of status relationships across the centuries; and to those who used and abused the metaphor of suffering as they crusaded against slavery and other forms of oppression." 5
These actual political concerns-they motivated her often, as is plain from the memorial tributes in Boston University Law Review-give Betsy Clark's work a sound which is entirely distinctive. In the footnotes and asides, one hears her voice as an individual, as specific to her as her image of Elizabeth Cady Stanton: a "majestic, solitary figure … sailing through the universe with a star in one hand and a ballot in the other." 6
The normative sound suggests that she perhaps came closer to the approach of what we now call law and culture than the approach of law and history. 7 If law/culture is distinguished by its relatively new emphasis on films, we can link Betsy Clark to that approach through her citation of Woody Allen. If the idea is a connection to the general culture, we can refer to her sense that she was, in her late piece on Frances Willard, pursuing the method of Jackson Pollock and just getting the material down on paper. Or we can cite the pictures she used to illustrate the discussion in Journal of American Of the range of questions historians approach-why something happened when it did or why something did not happen at all-Betsy Clark seems to have focused particularly on one: What did people mean by the words they used and how did those meanings relate to the professional legal understandings of those same words? She was concerned about the role of the state and the development of the state, but did not limit her inquiry to the official understandings and the official texts. Her sense of what was important in the rights discussion was different from the central legal and political narratives evidencing the development of rights arguments. She read what others have read but perhaps read those materials differently. She clearly read things that other people often do not read at all.
One can imagine that, had she lived to carry her work forward, Betsy Clark would have continued to work along the same lines. An anecdote about Jane Addams might have caught her attention. The story comes from Chicago in l903. It was midnight, and horses had been injured but not killed in a fire. Firemen in Chicago were supposed to ask judges for permission to shoot horses within the city limits. They could not find a judge and would have to wait until morning to relieve the suffering of the horses. They went to Jane Addams for permission to shoot the horses. She said, "I have no legal authority, but I will take responsibility" and she went to watch the shootings. 9 In this story, the private becomes public (though unofficial) through the fact that it is acknowledged, established as a kind of authority, recognized by those who submit themselves to it. Betsy Clark might have found the story interesting, linked as it seems to be to her inquiry into anti-statism in the 19 th century, and her projected work on 20 th century thinking.
Moving forward, Betsy Clark might have looked at the idea of rights, and of the status of constitutional or canonical texts about rights, as they appear to people in the general culture who are not professionally concerned with these texts. She might have commented on Elaine Scarry, talking about the language of the Declaration of Independence as though she were talking about the language of a poem, stressing scansion and rhythms. 10 Gage herself is cited several times in Betsy Clark's articles and Gage is discussed in a 1987 bibliographic essay:
Gage's masterwork, Woman, Church and State, published in 1893, remains one of the few scholarly investigations of that three-way relationship, and strikingly prefigures the work of contemporary feminist theologians like Mary Daly. Gage saw practices such as celibacy and witch-hunts as part of the church's policy to degrade women by perpetuating the image of a lustful and wicked female sexuality. For Gage, women's glory had been in the pre-Christian matriarchal societies; they had suffered their own Fall in their degradation after the establishment of Christianity. Equally prescient were Gage's descriptions of the psychology of oppression, of women's passivity and inability to exert themselves, their morbid dependence on men for their identities. 13 I think that in adopting a variation of Gage's title, Betsy might also have offered an explicit comment on Gage's view of the question of women and religion. Gage's view stressed the repressive aspects of church's teachings on women and the sinfulness of women's work for equality. Clark advanced a reading by women of religious materials which saw different possibilities. One might say that Betsy Clark's work on the question of religion and women, religion and women's rights, was an implicit comment on Gage's view, a response to someone with whom one was in conversation, as if to say, but perhaps there is more to be said.
As noted earlier, Betsy Clark did not write much directly on church and state. She was clear that separation meant more than disestablishment (noting the long process of legal and cultural change). She also thought that, while the vitality of the church might have been reduced, issues of church control in the 19 th century were still real. Her conclusion is a mid-point:
It is questionable whether either patriarchy or the church ruled as forcefully by Stanton's day as she suggests, or whether she was beating a dead horse. I think she was beating a sick horse. Both pure patriarchy and pure Calvinism were already well in decline by the mid-nineteenth century, with Stanton enthusiastically preparing to pound in the coffin nails. 14 There is little on the First Amendment to the United States Constitution or the standard cases, 19 th and 20 th century, which are thought to constitute the canon in the field of 13 Elizabeth Clark, Women and Religion in America, 1870-1920, in Gothic cathedrals. Peirce wrote: "One feels that the men who did these works did really believe in religion as we believe in nothing." 18 But then, in her concern with cultural materials she might have also seen some other things. Thinking more generally about America, Betsy Clark would have remembered that the United States has had often had higher church attendance records than Europe. Her historical focus might have suggested parallels with earlier times. For example, many medieval writers lived with a sense of the imminent return of the Messiah:
[M]any medieval authors believed that the prophecies of the Apocalypse and other visionary works were being fulfilled in the present, that the scriptural warnings were given so that Christians could prepare for the persecution that doctrine taught was imminent, and that it was imperative that they speak out with prophetic fervor condemning contemporary evils . 
Rights and Relationships from Nineteenth-Century Feminism to Twenty-First-Century International Human Rights: An Essay in Honor of Elizabeth Batelle Clark * Martha Minow Harvard Law School
Ideas about rights have inspired revolutions in politics and in homes; ideas about rights animate grassroots social movements and campaigns to hold governments accountable for their abuse and neglect of individuals and groups. Yet rights also inspire vivid critiques. Condemned as hopelessly abstract, incapable of generating adequate remedies, diverting political action into passive postures before courts, impotent in the face of private rather than governmental power, or mistakenly portraying people as isolated, self-determining individuals, 1 the idea of rights emerges both more battered and more ambiguous than their symbolic significance would suggest. Political theorists and lawyers have much to learn from historians who see rights as repositories of specific human aspirations and human actions, inflected by particular times and struggles, even as the language of rights becomes a basis for analogies and transformed meanings in new contexts. Indeed, unless we are aware of the historical context generating rights claims and rights consciousness, we risk misunderstanding or distorting their potential for strengthening human relationships and advancing social justice.
In this light, the unfinished work of historian Elizabeth Battelle Clark is particularly tantalizing. Rejecting the claim that nineteenth-century American women activists simply revived and reinterpreted the secular liberal rights consciousness of the nation's Founders, Clark examined the religious roots in two competing strands of nineteenth-century feminism. For modem secular readers, ignorant of the religious subtext of the nineteenth-century arguments, Clark performed a task rather like a musicologist who recognized musical notation alongside lyrics otherwise read simply as words. Clark found religious dimensions in not only the evangelical reformers but also the arguments of the liberal feminists and unearthed commonalties across camps usually understood as rivals. In so doing, she identified intellectual resources for a conception of rights expressive of human bonds and capable of advancing social and economic justice rather than solely individual autonomy.
She did not neglect difficulties in working out such a concept of rights. Those difficulties included the risk of state-backed coercion of individuals, biased views about the good that could oppress members of relatively powerless groups, and simple inability to attract sufficient political and legal support to achieve implementation. Yet even with these difficulties, rights claims become rich with current possibilities when they are relocated within the religious and political context of the nineteenth-century.
Clark acknowledged the differences between liberal and evangelical feminists and their liberal and evangelical forebears in the struggles to abolish slavery. Nonetheless, she found within all of them traces of the critique of Calvinism washing across Protestantism in America during the early 1800s. 2 If Christian theology had once treated pain and suffering as ordained by a judgmental God and inevitable given original sin, limited salvation, and the glorification of Christ's own suffering, newer Christian views of a benevolent God cultivated human sympathy for the bodily suffering of others. Antislavery activists built on these views to attack the suffering inflicted on slaves who no less than any other humans inhabited bodies created by a benevolent God. 3 Abolitionists summoned a notion of rights growing from the fact of human embodiment within a divine creation. Evangelicals in particular cultivated moral reasoning from sympathy, mirroring the warm bond between an individual and a loving God. Abolitionists joined in urging a right to self-ownership as fundamental to all other rights. Indeed, in the wake of liberal Protestantism, doing good as a matter of conscience was the path that should inspire relationships of respect and grounds for criticizing abusive relationships. 4 Clark argues that by stressing self-ownership, abolitionists meant to root a collection of rights addressing the wants and needs of a physical body. She described "the right to freedom of movement, the right to marry and establish domestic relations; the right of a female slave to refuse sexual relations with white men; and the right of a slave to be free of physical abuse or coercion imposed by masters or other quasi officials without due process of law," as well as a right to be free of coercion for any who respect the rights of others. 5 A right to self-ownership became central. Yet the connotation of solitary autonomy associated with that term today misses how it was infused with Christian conceptions of the path toward enlightenment. Accordingly, this right also implied the struggle for conscience and duty. 6
As feminists drew upon abolitionist ideas, they emphasized an analogy between abused or abandoned wives and the image of the suffering slave. They also extended the arguments against bodily coercion. For both liberal reformers exemplified by Elizabeth Cady Stanton, and evangelical activists, illustrated by Frances Willard and the Women's Christian Temperance Union, the human body became the touchstone for rights. The body could suffer. The body was divinely made. With a focus on the body that could suffer, feminists, like abolitionists, sought to cultivate empathy for the suffering of others. By emphasizing the divine origin of all humans, the feminists sought a kind of universality that also acknowledged differences. According to Clark, the feminists also meant to invoke the religious sensibility that "stressed the interconnections between rights and responsibilities, between civil and domestic relations, and between the workings of the state and the home." 7 Rights would represent ways of envisioning new social relationships, linked to responsibilities; rights would function within the context of a set of reciprocal obligations, with freedom dependent upon restraints and freedom even found in being bound to others. 8 Clark cites Jane Croly who viewed the interdependence of human beings as mirroring the interdependence of parts of one body. 9 This conception seems especially promising to those who are moved by the critique of liberal rights, charged with tending to neglect or suppress human relationships of interdependence and need. These critiques have gained steam since the 1970s and reflect both a second wave of feminism and other intellectual movements, affected by Marxism, the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory, and communitarianism. 10 Critics charged that rights predicated on the solitude and separateness of each person wrongly imply individual self-sufficiency or deny rights to anyone who demonstrates vulnerability or dependency. In this light, the nineteenth-century feminist notions of rights interconnected with responsibilities, mutual regard, and conscience afford a potential alternative. Indeed, the early feminists thought that individual rights would protect the community. 11 This alternative view is quite different from a notion of group rights: rights afforded to members of a group by dint of their group affiliation as a protection against intrusion and a basis for claiming access to certain goods or privileges. The feminists were interested in people who could be identified as members of groups-notably, women, and slaves. Yet they sought rights rooted in each person and each person's conscience. And they hoped to reconstruct society to promote the civic competence and personal development of each individual. 12 This hope is exemplified in the use of the word "woman" rather than "women" in their writings and even the names of their organizations and activities.
The feminists' alternative also offers a richer relational emphasis than the gesture toward relationships in the analytic jurisprudence of figures like Wesley Hohfeld. Hohfeld emphasized conceptual rather than sociological or psychological relationships. He wrote that legal rights have what he called correlatives, etching out relationships between the rights-bearing and others. Rights accordingly should be viewed as advantages conferred by the state, advantages that create particular vulnerabilities or restrictions for others. 13 If one person has a right, another has a duty; if one person has a privilege, another has no right; if one person has a power, another has a liability; and if one person has an immunity, the other has a disability. This variety was necessary because Hohfeld emphasized that it was a logical error to deduce rights from liberties, since some liberties carry no correlate duties for others not to interfere, and policy considerations rather than logic arrange the relationships among rights bearers and others. 14 Hohfeld's theory does not reflect the social, religious, and even psychological vision of the nineteenth-century feminists who would draw on religious conscience rather than policy to etch patterns of human interdependence to be recognized and supported by legal rights. Yet Hohfeld posed a challenge that is not fully addressed by the feminist notion of interdependence. He argued that rights theories cannot express an inherent logic because rights themselves encompass contradictory principles of freedom of action and security, resolvable only through ethical and policy debates. 15 The feminists acknowledge conflict but imagine it to take the form of abuse and coercion.
Clark explains that women writing in the 1850s revealed fears "that in the brave new world of politics there was no place for the standard of moral accountability which pertained between relatives, friends, and neighbors, and that the law was not creating any new ethic whereby the bonds of community, loosely worn but still taut in times of need, could be maintained." 16 Evangelical women built the Woman's Christian Temperance Union, a vision of informal bonds, animated by love, and nonconfrontational methods of persuasion to match their opposition to force and coercion as means and as ends. 17 Proceeding themselves from a sense of obligation in their efforts to improve the lives of poor people and prisoners, the feminists hoped others would do the same.
This created for the women advocates a different sort of difficulty: how could their vision be translated into a theory of governance; involving the state? Although the feminists sought social justice, they resisted the kind of coercion represented by government policy power. Clark explains, "Far from looking to government for remedies and favors, there was a strong emphasis on self-help and a belief that, by readying themselves and their neighbors, activists could bring about the desired transformation without seeking direct political change or soliciting governmental intervention." 18 Influenced by abolitionist work, the reformers had to question state power that had enforced slavery. 19 Ideally, they saw charitable work not as private work but as a public alternative to government. Women's groups raised money to build sidewalks, hospitals, and other local services. 20 In these ways, they would avoid the problems later identified with twentieth-century "governance feminism," policy initiatives relying on governmental power. 21 The nineteenth-century feminists thought the Golden Rule should be the first principle of governance: treat others as you would want to be treated. 22 Yet, the Woman's Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) women came to want more effectiveness in implementing their vision. To pursue the idea of "organized mother love," after the Civil War they did begin to advocate for state actions and government prohibitions, epitomized by the ban on alcohol. 23 By the turn of the century, the WCTU came to stand for repressive force, using government power to implement the presumption that some know what is best for all, and using state power to impose the views of a group of white, upper-and middle-class women on others. Yet its members began with a different vision: the goal was to resist all coercion and force, and instead seek mutual aid and local action.
Liberal feminists diverged sharply and embraced instead the individualist version of rights. Elizabeth Cady Stanton's early writings may have been ambiguous, but as time went on she sharply differed from the evangelical feminists. Notably, after the Civil War, Stanton built upon abolitionist arguments against positive law and pushed for sharp limits on the power of the government. 24 The government should at best protect individual liberty. Hence, she called for divorce in the name of personal liberty. 25 She emphasized personal liberty producing skepticism of state power, and she objected to using the Golden Rule to guide government by raising doubt that anyone could really know others well enough to know what they want. 26 Nonetheless, she used the notion of rights to articulate autonomy and self-determination. Sometimes, you just need the language of rights to say no, to erect a barrier against coercion, to demand the space to be, to choose, to diverge.
The liberal theory, backed by Stanton, could elaborate individual freedom for these purposes but could not afford a basis for government action in pursuit of social justice. The evangelical theory, backed by Willard, could pursue a vision of the collective good but in so doing, underestimated the malignant and coercive dangers of government action. 27 Is there any alternative to these two positions?
I think that Clark unearthed resources for an alternative view from the points of connection among feminists who later diverged: Their shared commitment to the body that can suffer as the locus of rights, their recognition that self-ownership should entail the ability to feed and care for the body and to develop the self. Cultivating a sense of obligation and creating the social change they advocated by their own local and collective action, the feminists engaged in governance even when they bypassed formal government power.
The work of mutual and communal help animated the settlement house movement in the early twentieth century, and like some of the nineteenth-century feminist local action, generated some changes in positive law. Many attribute to their work the foundations of the welfare state. 28 Jane Addams, for example, initiated factory inspections as a private citizen of a sort that later become mandated by law. But her efforts at Hull House modeled forms of social relationships, as wealthy college graduates moved to poor immigrant neighborhoods and participated jointly with local residents in cultural and political activities. Today we might call this "capacity building." 29 A more recent but similar effort is the battered women's movement, which created new private institutions-shelters-while also successfully agitating for changes in the law and in the practices of police and judges. Again, a conception of bodily integrity and self-ownership proved central-but as important were commitments to ensure that women could fulfill their roles as mothers, protecting their children from abuse, and women could find strength by helping one another.
Yes, dilemmas and compromises have accompanied the successes of the battered women's movement. When shelters receive public dollars, they become more professionalized and bureaucratic and less characterized by mutual aid. 30 A few commentators have struggled to articulate a right to a safe relationship rather than simply severing the relationship with an abuser. 31 This idea points toward personal and social transformations unlikely to be achieved by law. When laws change to protect people from violence in their homes, state power grows, and that power can be abused or can generate public backlash. 32 Yet advocates can instead work to raise consciousness, and build informal and formal relationships and institutions on the ground and in tune with people's expectations and demands. This has been a guiding approach in the battered women's movement, which seeks in large part to promote changes in people and their relationships, rather like the nineteenth-century feminists' efforts to build on liberal Protestantism's invitation to change human relationships. 33 The contemporary international human rights movement also expresses similar themes. For international human rights around the world, advocates have stressed the crucial importance of nongovernmental, often grassroots action; the centrality of consciousness-raising in remaking norms, institutions, and practices; and the affirmation of these changes in formal legal documents, created to confirm the changes in mindset already underway. 34 That contemporary international human rights work addresses social and economic rights as much as political and civil rights mirrors the nineteenth-century feminists' effort to resist the division between negative and positive liberties. Lacking a global government, these approaches may be inevitable for international human rights. Networks bridging governmental and nongovernmental actors, and efforts to secure national endorsement and to design international institutions respecting the role of nongovernmental actors, have characterized international human rights development.
The nineteenth-century feminists illustrated the resources enabled by "the powers of the weak," mobilizing to create social change in method as well as ultimate vision, and building upon a mass consciousness change enabled by the reforms of liberal Protestantism. Liberal conceptions of rights remain important to constrain government power from abuse, even when it is authorized in the name of doing good. Yet Clark's work lifts up the implicit commitments to mutual aid, responsibility, and recognition of the common needs of all humans at work in ideas of rights. She also demonstrates the significance of social and religious movements in inspiring people to enact the vision they advocate in their own relationships and local actions.
Clark's work also teaches that the thinking of nineteenth-century feminists can assist current efforts to articulate rights as necessarily relational. 35 The earlier thinkers emphasize more than current theorists that seeing rights relationally requires seeking mutual accommodation, recognizing responsibilities, and finding strength and even freedom through bonds with others. No less is demanded by recognition of each body's rights. This recognition might hold a deeper vision for rights than the image of total control over one's solitary property that animates individualistic notions. The dilemmas of reconciling individual liberty and security and benevolent and oppressive state power remain. I wish Elizabeth Clark were here to develop more fully how she believes these tensions can be addressed, but the challenge now falls to others. Meanwhile, the connections she so finely drew between religious revision and transformative social movements offer renewed inspiration. Lyndon Shanley, Relational Rights and Responsibilities: Revisioning the Family in Liberal Political Theory and Law, 11 HYPATIA 4 (1996) .
